Network Forensics & ICS Security
Reconstructing a multi-stage SCADA attack from packets
Context
A Cyber-Physical Systems Security investigation into a multi-stage intrusion at “CTI Utilities”, a water-treatment operator, combined with enterprise network-design work in Cisco Packet Tracer (VLAN/NAT/static routing) that demonstrates the segmentation the victim lacked.
The problem
An external attacker defaced a safety-critical HMI by stepping-stone from a low-value public asset into a secure OT network. The investigation had to answer the brief’s forensic questions from packet evidence alone, quantify asset risk, and recommend controls that would have broken the kill chain.
My approach
I scored 17 assets with a CARVER matrix to prioritise defence, modelled three attack pathways as an attack tree (selecting the direct VPN route as optimal), then reconstructed the actual intrusion packet-by-packet in Wireshark — correlating timestamps, IPs, ports and HTTP streams into interim forensic memos and a final incident report.
Reconstructed kill chain · IT → OT
- 01
Reconnaissance
T1595 · Active ScanningDistributed scan from 3 IPs against the Web Server (192.168.121.151) — ports 22 / 80 / 443.
- 02
Initial Access
T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing AppBrute force on /wp-login.php → WordPress admin compromise on the public web server.
- 03
Pivot / Lateral
T1021.001 · Remote DesktopWeb Server → GIT Server (dual IT/OT firewall access) → RDP (3389) into the Operations WS.
- 04
ICS Impact
T0880 · Manipulation of ViewStolen JSESSIONID cookie → malicious upload (anonymous.gif) defacing the ScadaBR HMI.
Risk-based prioritisation (CARVER)
The CARVER matrix ranked the VPN Server (52) and the LIMS lab (49) as the most attractive targets — both running end-of-life Ubuntu — surfacing the systemic problem of unsupported software across critical assets.
Findings & recommendations
Three root-cause findings drove a prioritised remediation plan.
- Insufficient network segmentation (CRITICAL) — strict IT/OT firewall rules
- Weak access control — enforce MFA on all remote / RDP access
- Legacy / EOL systems — emergency patch-management programme
- Hard HMI session timeouts to neutralise stolen-cookie hijacking
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
Behaviours were mapped across both matrices: Enterprise (T1595 Active Scanning, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App, T1110.001 Brute Force, T1021.001 RDP, T1552.001 Credentials in Files) and ICS (T0862 Exploitation of Remote Services, T0880 Manipulation of View) and visualised in ATT&CK Navigator.
Secure-by-design networking
Complementary Cisco Packet Tracer work built high-availability corporate topologies using VLAN segmentation, NAT and static routing — the exact controls whose absence enabled the CTI Utilities breach, and passing 100% of simulation tests.
Outcome
A complete incident report aligned to NIST SP 800-82 / 800-61, with forensic memos, an attack tree, CARVER scoring and dual-matrix ATT&CK mapping — translating raw packets into board-level business risk and concrete controls.